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THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 
J. BRIAN ATWOOD* 
INTRODUCTION 
This analysis of the origins and the functioning of the War Powers 
Resolution is a product of research and personal experience in both Congress 
and the Executive Branch.  I had the great privilege of working with Senator 
Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.) from 1972 to 1977, a period when war powers 
and the Vietnam War were at the top of his and the country’s national security 
agenda.  The Senator was a leader in the Senate on war powers, and one of the 
original co-sponsors of the legislation, along with Senators Jacob Javits (R.-
N.Y.) and John Stennis (D.-Miss.).  Senator Eagleton’s book, War and 
Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender, fully explains 
his position on the constitutional issue and chronicles his efforts to promote a 
war powers bill that was consistent with the Constitution of the United States.1 
I returned to the Executive Branch in 1977 and assumed responsibility for 
managing relations with Congress for the State Department.  That experience 
gave me a unique exposure to the attitudes and techniques employed by 
executive branch policymakers and their legal counsels as they sought to 
interpret—and frequently avoid—the requirements of the War Powers 
Resolution. 
 
* J. Brian Atwood is the dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University 
of Minnesota. Atwood served for six years as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) during the administration of President William Clinton.  In the Clinton 
administration, Atwood led the transition team at the State Department and was Under Secretary 
of State for Management prior to his appointment as head of USAID.  In 2001, Atwood served on 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Panel on Peace Operations.  He joined the Foreign Service 
in 1966 and served in the American Embassies in Cote d’Ivoire and Spain.  He served as 
legislative advisor for foreign and defense policy to Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D.-Mo.) from 
1972–1977.  During the Carter administration Atwood served as Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations.  He was Dean of Professional Studies and Academic Affairs at the 
Foreign Service Institute in 1981–1982.  Atwood was the first President of the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) from 1986–1993.  Atwood received the 
Secretary of State’s Distinguished Service Award in 1999. 
 1. See THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER (1974). 
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This article concludes that the War Powers Resolution has failed to 
recreate balance in our system on issues of war and peace, that it has produced 
perversions in internal executive branch decision-making and that its key 
consultation provision has been easily avoided because Congress has failed to 
organize itself in such a way as to make consultations unavoidable, secure, and 
meaningful. 
In an era when the predominant security threat comes from non-state 
actors—international terrorists—the Executive Branch has retained the legal 
and political initiative and dominates the debate over the use of force.  
Arguably, one consequence is that the option of engaging in conflict, 
especially in the face of terrorist threats, is far more attractive than less 
dangerous and more effective alternatives. 
I.  THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was inspired by congressional 
frustration over an unpopular war.  The Vietnam engagement evolved from a 
military advisory mission in the early 1960s to a hot war in 1964, when 
Vietnamese naval vessels allegedly attacked American ships in the Gulf of 
Tonkin.2  President Lyndon Johnson asked Congress “to join in affirming the 
national determination that all such attacks will be met. . . .”3  With little 
debate and even less opposition, the Southeast Asia Resolution (popularly 
known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) was passed and became law.4 
Principal authors of the Tonkin Resolution later argued that it was not their 
intention to authorize a wider war.5  Still, the Executive Branch cited this 
authority in escalating the Vietnam conflict exponentially, starting with the 
landing of Marines in Vietnam in 1965.6  In 1967, Senator Clifford Case of 
New Jersey argued that President Johnson had “misused the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution. . . .  [And] that he has done it by relying on the exact language of 
the resolution, rather than upon the spirit in which we moved together in a 
particular emergency.”7  Case went on to say that “what we [the Congress] 
 
 2. John H. Messing, American Actions in Vietnam: Justifiable in International Law?, 19 
STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1316–17 (1967). 
 3. 110 CONG. REC. 18,237 (1964) (message from President Lyndon B. Johnson, The 
Situation in Southeast Asia). 
 4. Joint Resolution of Congress, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384, H.J. Res. 1145 (1964). 
 5. 113 CONG. REC. 26,722 (1967) (statement of Sen. Case). 
 6. MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, REACHING FOR GLORY: LYNDON B. JOHNSON’S SECRET WHITE 
HOUSE TAPES 1964–1965 (2001); EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 109 (noting that the Gulf Tonkin 
Resolution authorized the executive branch to justify a major incursion in Southeast Asia); Jack 
Shulimson et al., U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 67 J. OF AM. 
HIST. 200 (1980). 
 7. 113 CONG. REC. 26,722 (1967) (statement of Sen. Case). 
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were doing when we adopted the resolution was showing unity at a time of 
emergency.”8 
Case, a Republican who later became one of the authors of an amendment 
to end combat activity in Indochina,9 was reflecting a common concern over 
the dynamic that tends to overwhelm more deliberative processes when a 
president declares that it is time to take military action.  Professor John T. 
Rourke, in his book Presidential Wars and American Democracy: Rally 
’Round the Chief, described this dynamic well: 
Sometimes the urge to achieve unity is so strong that any degree of dissent 
comes under suspicion. . . . [E]very war spawns patriotic zealots who accuse 
war dissenters of sympathizing with, or even aiding and abetting, the enemy.  
The press is also restrained, and the public willingly accepts the argument that 
information will assist the enemy.10 
A peace agreement was signed in 1973, and American POWs were 
released from Hanoi prisons.  (The war officially ended with the Paris Peace 
Accords on January 27, 1973, but complete American withdrawal did not 
occur until the Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975).11  The Johnson and Nixon 
administrations justified the engagement in combat on the basis of the Tonkin 
Resolution until it was repealed by Congress in 1970.12  Thereafter, their 
justification was based on the grounds that the Congress passed appropriations 
bills funding the war and that the Commander in Chief had the constitutional 
authority to pursue his military goals.13  Combat activity continued even after 
the POWs were released in Cambodia and Laos, on their borders with 
Vietnam.14  Then, in May 1973, Senator Eagleton introduced an amendment to 
an appropriations bill stating that no money in the present bill “or heretofore 
appropriated under any other act” may be used for combat activity in 
Indochina.15  This amendment passed both houses and was then vetoed by 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. 119 CONG. REC. 15,436 (1973) (statements of Sens. Case and Church). 
 10. JOHN T. ROURKE, PRESIDENTIAL WARS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: RALLY ’ROUND 
THE CHIEF 8 (1993). 
 11. U.S. Department of State, Ending the Vietnam War, 1973–1975, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dr/17411.htm; Fall of Saigon (1975), BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/05/vietnam_war/html/fall_of_saigon.stm. 
 12. Cooper-Church Amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-652 (Jan. 5, 1971).  A revised Cooper-
Church Amendment, Public Law 91-652, passed both houses of Congress on December 22, 1970, 
and was enacted on January 5, 1971.  See EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 109 (noting that the Gulf 
Tonkin Resolution authorized the Executive Branch to justify a major incursion in Southeast 
Asia.); Id. at 117 (noting the 1970 repeal of the Gulf Tonkin Resolution). 
 13. Cooper-Church Amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-652, 84 Stat. 1942 (1971); ROURKE, supra 
note 10, at 103. 
 14. Fall of Saigon (1975), supra note 11. 
 15. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 160. 
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President Nixon.16  Finally, a compromise—the Fulbright Amendment, named 
for the then-chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—was 
reached, allowing for forty-five more days of bombing and then terminating 
the war once and for all.17 
It was against this background of presidential initiative and congressional 
frustration that members of Congress and legal scholars began to explore the 
Founders’ intentions in distributing the Constitution’s war powers to the two 
branches of government.  Congress’s war powers initiative was meant to 
recapture its powers for future situations.  It was not proposed as a means to 
end the Vietnam War, but it was heavily influenced by Congress’s 
ineffectiveness in its effort to convince the Executive to reverse course in that 
war. 
II.  THE FOUNDERS’ INTENT: OVERTAKEN BY POLITICS 
Congress was on firm constitutional ground in seeking to legislate in the 
war powers area.  The bias reflected in the Founders’ debates over this issue 
was overwhelmingly in Congress’s favor.18  Senator Eagleton and his Senate 
co-sponsors focused on modern contingencies the nation faced and sought to 
update the delegation of authority to the President in emergency situations.  
Their bill defined the limited emergency situations wherein the President 
would be authorized to act to “repel sudden attacks.”19  The minutes of the 
deliberations at the Federal Convention of 1787 reflect a motion made by 
James Madison and Eldridge Gerry to insert “declare,” striking out “make” 
war, leaving to the Executive the power to “repel sudden attacks.”20  Sudden 
attacks in 1787 were seen as limited to the territory of the United States.21  The 
Senate sponsors saw the need to extend the scope of these emergency powers 
to defend U.S. forces stationed abroad and to rescue U.S. citizens if all other 
means to protect them had been exhausted.22  In all other cases, the President 
would be required to seek the prior approval of Congress.23 
The authors of the Senate bill cited the Constitution’s “necessary and 
proper” clause as justification for legislating in this area.  This clause, Article I, 
 
 16. Id. at 173. 
 17. See Fulbright Amendment to Second Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 
Stat. 129 (1973). 
 18. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318–19 (Max Farand, ed., 
Yale University Press Vol. II 1937). 
 19. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res, 93d 
Cong. (1973). 
 20. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 18. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res, 93d 
Cong. (1973). 
 23. See id. 
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Section 8, Clause 18, invites the two branches “to make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers. . . .”24  The power to “declare war” was an explicit “foregoing 
power.”25 
What emerged from the House-Senate conference committee seemed to 
turn the Constitution on its head in Senator Eagleton’s view.  A non-binding 
“purpose and policy” section asserted that presidents could only introduce 
forces “into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” pursuant to  “(1) a 
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national 
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces.”26  However, this language was hortatory and 
non-binding.  The binding provisions, in fact, contradicted the “purpose and 
policy” section, by conceding the right (House proponents would use the word 
“reality”) of presidents to initiate military action without prior approval. 
This led Senator Eagleton, in an act of considerable courage, to oppose the 
legislation he had helped initiate, and then when the conference report passed, 
to support President Nixon’s veto.27  He was joined by very few of his 
Democratic colleagues, who saw the War Powers Resolution as a good 
opportunity to override a veto and send a message to an unpopular President, 
Richard M. Nixon.28  Eagleton said later: 
We in Congress were frustrated with our failure to override eight successive 
Presidential vetoes, and, considering the tremendous pressures then created by 
the Watergate scandal, it is understandable how this Congress overrode 
President Nixon’s war power veto.  The irony, of course, is that we were 
actually expanding, not limiting Presidential war-making power.29 
That, of course, is not how President Nixon and his legal advisors saw it.  
In his veto message to Congress, the President used sweeping language to 
condemn the resolution as unconstitutional.  “House Joint Resolution 542 (the 
War Powers Resolution) would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, 
authorities which the [P]resident has properly exercised under the Constitution 
for almost 200 years,” the statement asserted.30  The message focused on 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 25. Id. 
 26. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res, 93d 
Cong. (1973). 
 27. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 206. 
 28. See id. at 212–20. 
 29. A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution: Hearings 
before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 4–5 (1977) (emphasis added).  The War 
Powers Resolution became law on November 7, 1973, after both houses of Congress overrode 
President Nixon’s veto. 
 30. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
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provisions that would “automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days 
unless the Congress extended them.”31  It also protested a provision (Section 
5(c)) allowing Congress to terminate engagement in hostilities by a concurrent 
resolution, “an action which does not normally have the force of law, since it 
denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation.”32 
What was perhaps more remarkable about the veto message was its 
endorsement of Section 3, which “calls for consultations with the Congress 
before and during the involvement of the United States forces in hostilities 
abroad.”33  The Nixon statement called for “regularized consultations with the 
Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.”34  This call for 
consultations was repeated over the years.  The State Department legal advisor 
during the Carter administration, for example, urged Congress to create 
“efficient machinery for conducting those consultations.”35 
The Nixon veto statement and future executive branch communications 
have asserted that the sixty-day cut-off provision (which can be extended to 
ninety days with a presidential waiver) is unconstitutional in that it is 
automatic and requires no subsequent legislation.36  Defenders of the provision 
state that Congress must be involved in making the initial decision to go to war 
and that an automatic cut-off by concurrent resolution preserves Congress’s 
explicit power over war.  (A claim that an automatic cut-off provision is 
unconstitutional is unrealistically broad and would pick up many “sunset” 
provisions terminating legislative mandates on a date certain.).37  A subsequent 
Supreme Court decision, INS v. Chadha struck down the legislative veto and 
may have given the Executive Branch’s argument more credibility.38  Even 
though Chadha’s rationale applied to legislation giving Congress the power to 
overturn presidential action in certain areas (such as arms sales) and did not 
deal with war powers, per se, the clear sentiment of the Court was to preserve 
the Executive’s final role in approving or vetoing legislation.39 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 895. 
 34. Id. 
 35. A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 
12, at 189. 
 36. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 30, at 894. 
 37. E-mail from Michael Glennon, Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of 
Tufts University, to J. Brian Atwood, Dean, University of Minnesota’s Humphrey Institute of 
Public Affairs (Aug. 21, 2007, 12:26:44  CST) (on file with author). 
 38. 462 U.S. 917, 951–60 (1983); JACOB K. JAVITS, THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS: FROM 
THE FEDERALISTS TO REAGAN 2 (Demetrios Caraley ed., Academy of Political Science 1984). 
 39. JAVITS, supra note 38, at 2–3.  This point continues to be debated among legal scholars, 
but it is the view of Professor Glennon that Chadha invalidates Section 5(c), the concurrent 
resolution cut-off provision.  Glennon, supra note 37. 
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The provision of the War Powers Resolution that triggers the sixty-to 
ninety-day clock is Section 4(a)(1), a requirement to report to Congress within 
forty-eight hours the circumstances and the authorities used to deploy U.S. 
forces into hostile situations.40  Reports have been sent to Congress over the 
years, but they have been very brief and contained no information that was not 
already in the public domain.41  Often the reports did not cite Section 4(a)(1) 
explicitly in an apparent effort to avoid the cut-off trigger.42 
We are left then with President Nixon’s sweeping assertion that the 
resolution is unconstitutional in its entirety43 and Senator Eagleton’s more 
legitimate complaint that the delegation of authority to the President to initiate 
the use of force without prior approval usurps Congress’s power to “declare 
war.”44  Most provisions in the resolution, however, are not controversial and 
clearly do not raise issues of constitutionality. 
Anticipating that the Executive Branch would claim that certain provisions 
were unconstitutional, Congress inserted a “separability clause” at the very end 
of the resolution.  This section states: “If any provision of this joint resolution 
or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any 
other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.”45  This clause and 
the explicit reference to Congress’s power “to declare war”46 in the 
constitution when combined with the invitation of the “necessary and proper”47 
clause to legislate, gives considerable standing to many of the provisions of the 
resolution.  Despite the Judicial Branch’s traditional reluctance to resolve 
political disputes between the other two branches over war powers, until 
recently executive branch lawyers have proceeded with utmost caution in 
advising presidents of their legal obligations in this area. 
It is important to note that while the automatic cut-off provisions in 
Section 5 of the resolution have been presented to the courts, the judiciary 
traditionally has either refused to give standing to the plaintiffs or has declared 
the issue to be “political” and a matter to be resolved between the other 
 
 40. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res, 93d 
Cong. (1973). 
 41. See Michael Rubner, Antiterrorism and the Withering of the 1973 War Powers 
Resolution, 102, POL. SCI. Q. 193, 201–02 (1987). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 30. 
 44. EAGLETON, supra, note 1, at 208. 
 45. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, 559, H.R.J. Res, 93d 
Cong. (1973). 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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branches.48  Within the Executive Branch, however, much attention has been 
given to the consultation and reporting provisions.  As I testified in 1986 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “[I]t is with the knowledge that 
these provisions have the full weight of the law that succeeding administrations 
have constructed elaborate rationalizations to avoid their force.”49 
Executive branch legal advisors must constantly wind their way through 
Scylla and Charybdis, the mythological monsters on either side of the narrow 
strait traversed by Ulysses.  On the one side is concern over yielding any of the 
constitutional territory claimed by a succession of presidents.  On the other is 
the knowledge that the consultation and reporting requirements are legally 
binding and that it is a lawyer’s obligation to assure that one’s client respects 
the law. 
There is a deep concern in the Executive Branch that any concession to 
Congress on war powers will create a precedent that could erode presidential 
powers.  Administrations take seriously legal historian Edwin Corwin’s 
description of the Constitution as “an invitation to struggle.”50  This is 
especially true in areas of foreign policy and national security.  As Crenson 
and Ginsberg observed, “Over the course of more than two centuries . . . 
successive American presidents, beginning with George Washington, have 
labored diligently to make their office the dominant force in American foreign 
and security policy and to subordinate Congress’s role in the realm.”51 
The issue for administration legal advisors, as they privately have 
described it to me, is the automatic cut off provisions in Section 5.  While they 
challenge these as unconstitutional, they do not wish to bring on a court test, 
however unlikely.  Nor do they wish to see a clash of wills that could lead 
Congress to use its power of the purse to end a combat operation.  Thus, the 
argument goes, Section 4(a)(1), the reporting clause that triggers the cut-off 
provisions, must never be explicitly cited unless the military operation already 
 
 48. Glennon, supra note 37.  Professor Glennon points out that 245 House Members 
challenged the 1988 operation to escort Kuwaiti ships during the Gulf War.  The 245 Members 
contended that a 4(a)(1) report was required on the date the operation commenced and that the 
sixty-day clock was triggered.  The D.C. District Court, in Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 
334 (D.D.C. 1987), affirmed, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 117, 1988), dismissed the request for a 
declaratory judgment as non-justiciable the D.C. Circuit affirmed.  This case is discussed in detail 
in Professor Glennon’s book, Constitutional Diplomacy. 
 49. War Powers, Libya, and State-Sponsored Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Arms Control, International Security, and Science of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong. 
62 (1986) (statement of J. Brian Atwood, Dir. of the National Democratic Institute). 
 50. MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: UNCHECKED AND 
UNBALANCED 215 (2007). 
 51. Id. 
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has been terminated.  In fact, it only was cited once, after the attack on 
Cambodia, after the Mayaguez incident of 1975.52 
Concern about triggering the cut-off provisions also influences internal 
executive branch deliberations over whether or when it is necessary to consult 
with Congress under Section 3.  Administration legal advisors see the 
consultation provision as a slippery slope.  Its conditions for consultation, 
especially the requirement to consult in “situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,” could 
trigger the reporting requirement which, in turn, triggers Section 5.53 
How, then, to develop a rationale to avoid consultations?  In cases where a 
choice is made not to consult under Section 3 or to report under Section 4(a)(1) 
a legal case is built by the Justice Department in coordination with State, 
Defense, and White House counsels.  Over the years, these cases have grown 
more and more imaginative.  Some of the more sensitive of these opinions 
have never been shared with Congress, as they are considered privileged 
communications.  Yet, they form the internal case histories, available to future 
executive branch lawyers as important precedents.54 
In 1981, the Reagan administration decided to test Libya’s claim that the 
Gulf of Sidra was within its territorial waters.55  The United States insisted that 
the gulf was in international waters.56  The U.S. Navy had transited those 
waters during the Carter administration, but only after informing the Qaddafi 
government that their intentions were peaceful.57  The Reagan administration 
had no intention of informing Libya, and they had to assume that their actions 
might be provocative.58  Was this a situation where “imminent involvement in 
hostilities” could be “clearly indicated by the circumstances?” 
Consulting Congress under the War Powers Resolution in this case might 
well have revealed an intent to provoke.  Instead, the legal advisors developed 
a “probability-of-conflict” rationale.59  If the Pentagon determined that the 
likelihood of combat was fifty percent or more, then—and only then—would 
 
 52. Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War 
Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 89–90 (1984). 
 53. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res, 93d 
Cong. (1973) (emphasis added). 
 54. War Powers, supra note 49, at 63. 
 55. Anne Bardin, Costal State’s Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
27, 69 (2002). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 668, 669, 673 
n.21 (1986). 
 58. See id. at 673, 673 n.21. 
 59. Louis Henkin et al., War Powers and the Responsibility of Congress, 82 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 1, 14 (1988) (various speakers, including Brian Atwood, participated in a panel 
discussion convened in the Senate Foreign Relations Hearing Room). 
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Congress have to be consulted in advance.60  The fifty percent probability 
threshold was run through in various computer-generated scenarios and never 
reached.61  Congress was not consulted.62 
According to a State Department legal advisor who participated in the 
deliberations, a more serious issue arose when the Navy requested a change in 
the “rules of engagement” (ROE) prior to the Gulf of Sidra exercise.63  ROEs 
are standing orders to the military command issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
They are fashioned to take circumstances into consideration, e.g., the 
probability of hostilities.  The Navy requested the change from peacetime ROE 
to enable its pilots to fire on Libyan planes when they “locked on” to U.S. 
aircraft with their radar systems, thus indicating they were targeting our 
planes.64  This request was denied when the lawyers pointed out that such a 
change in the ROE would demonstrate that the administration knew in advance 
that the hostilities clearly were indicated by the circumstances.65  This change 
would have rendered the “probability of conflict” construct unusable and 
would have made a failure to consult Congress difficult to rationalize.66 One 
can only assume that the margin of risk involved was small and acceptable.  
Navy pilots shot down two aircraft after the Libyans had launched air-to-air 
missiles at them.67 
The Long Commission, established to investigate the October 23, 1983, 
terrorist attack in which 241 U.S. Marines were killed in Lebanon, concluded 
ex post facto that peacetime ROE in that situation were an unacceptable 
margin of risk.68  The Commission was highly critical of the chain of 
command for its failure to adjust the ROE to accommodate to a more hostile 
environment.69  The Commission Report stated that the Marines were under 
orders “not to engage in combat” and that they were to use “normal . . . 
peacetime ROE.”70  The Report went on to say that “for any ROE to be 
effective, they should incorporate definitions of hostile intent and hostile action 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Henkin, supra, note 59. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See War Powers, supra note 49, at 64. 
 68. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON BEIRUT, DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE DOD 
COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT, OCTOBER 23, 1983, 32–33, 
47–48 (1983) [hereinafter LONG COMMISSION]. 
 69. Id. at 48, 51 
 70. Id. at 45. 
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that correspond to the realities of the environment in which they are to be 
implemented.”71 
There is no hard evidence that these Marines were made vulnerable 
because of the desire to avoid consultations with Congress under the War 
Powers Resolution.  However, it seems clear that the administration knew that 
the Marines had been placed in a situation where hostilities were at least 
imminent, if not ongoing. 
During the period prior to the terrorist attack, the administration was 
engaged in a major dispute with key members of Congress over war powers.  
The administration argued that U.S. forces in Lebanon were not involved in 
hostilities as defined by the law.  Yet, on August 29, 1983, two Marines were 
killed and fourteen wounded when they received and returned hostile fire.72  
On September 1, an additional 2000 Marines were sent in, along with fighter 
planes and artillery.73  On September 12, the Marines were authorized to call in 
air strikes.74  On September 19, U.S. naval forces offshore shelled the Suk el 
Gharb area in support of the Lebanese Army, an action cited in the Long 
Commission Report as having changed the fundamental nature of our 
involvement.75 
Rules of engagement should reflect the potential for danger to U.S. 
military forces, as the Long Commission stated.  They represent a key factor in 
assessing whether the Executive Branch considers hostilities to be “clearly 
indicated by the circumstances.”  If Congress truly were interested in 
preserving its war powers and in assuring that our military forces are being 
adequately protected, it would take a keen interest in the state of these rules. 
III.  WAR POWERS IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but it is a growing threat. The attack 
on the United States on September 11, 2001, evoked an overwhelming public 
response and a demand that our government protect the domestic population 
and punish the terrorists.  The public looked to the president for leadership, and 
an immediate consequence was that an already assertive Executive Branch 
became even more dominant in the war powers area.  Addressing the nation in 
the immediate aftermath of the attacks in New York, Washington, and 
Pennsylvania, President George W. Bush said “we stand together to win the 
war against terrorism.”76  The atmosphere inside the White House was 
captured by CIA Director George Tenet in his recent book: 
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  After 9/11, everything changed.  Many foreign policy issues were now 
viewed through the prism of smoke rising from the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon.  For many in the Bush administration, Iraq was unfinished 
business.  They seized on the emotional impact of 9/11 and created a 
psychological connection between the failure to act decisively against al-
Qa’ida and the danger posed by Iraq’s WMD programs. 77 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) document released to the public by 
the Bush administration in 2002 was described by President Bush in a cover 
letter as “a wartime national security strategy.”78  The document distinguished 
the new threat from the Cold War-era threat, saying that during the Cold War 
the adversary was “a generally status quo, risk averse adversary. . . .”  Today, 
however, “our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of 
choice.”79  This led, in the same document, to the “preemption doctrine,” 
wherein “we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”80 
The concept of preemption has been with the nation since the very 
beginning.  The discussion over giving the President the right to “repel sudden 
attacks” assumed that the Executive would not have to await an actual attack if 
solid information existed to the effect that an attack was imminent.81  
However, the phrase in the NSS stating “even if uncertainty remains. . . .” 
dramatically changes the traditional concept of preemption.82  Both Ron 
Suskind (The One-Percent Doctrine) and George Tenet (At the Center of the 
Storm: My Years at the CIA) recount Vice President Cheney’s instructions.  
Suskind quotes a source who recalled Cheney saying, “If there’s a one percent 
chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear 
weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.  It’s not 
about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence.  It’s about our 
response.”83 
It is unimaginable that an administration that has such an expanded view of 
its authority to defend the nation against terrorism would pay heed to a 
requirement in the War Powers Resolution to consult in advance.  The Bush 
administration also has adopted the “unitary executive theory,” which 
centralizes power within the White House and constrains departments and 
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agencies in their interactions with Congress.84  It is doubtful that executive 
branch lawyers are playing the role they once did in the war powers arena. 
For its part, Congress performed as Congresses often do in time of crisis.  
Just as in the case of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Congress supported the 
President’s desire to pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq.85  Rourke’s 
description of the political dynamic that exists when the nation is facing a 
crisis certainly held in this case.86 
Concerns that irrational reactions can take hold when the nation is in crisis 
are not new.  Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in 1833 wrote that republics 
suffered from dangerous tendencies to be “too ambitious of military fame and 
conquest” “imbecile in defense, and eager for contest.”87  Alexander Hamilton 
warned of times when “the national councils may be warped by some strong 
passion or momentary interest. . . .”88 
The 9/11 attacks certainly created strong passion.  As Hamilton observed, 
the Constitution envisioned an Executive who could act with “decision, 
activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”89  He added, however, that Congress’s power 
over war provided “safety in the republican sense.”90  The question remains as 
to whether Congress played its role when it was asked by the President to 
authorize war against Iraq. 
George Tenet has confirmed—and others have reported—that a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was sent to the Congress in the midst of the debate 
over Iraq.91  It was ninety pages long and was kept in a vault in the center of 
the Capitol.92  Dana Priest of the Washington Post quotes congressional aides 
responsible for safeguarding the material as saying “no more than six Senators 
and a handful of House members read beyond the five-page . . . 
summary. . . .”93 
It is doubtful that a full reading of the NIE would have changed many 
minds.  According to Tenet, the document seemed to confirm that Iraq 
possessed WMD, though the evidence was skimpy and based more on 
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historical than current analysis.94  It offered nothing to support the widely-held 
perception—promoted by the White House—that Iraq was behind the 9/11 
attacks, and little to prove that there was an al Qaeda–Iraq connection.95  The 
document was typically obscure.  It was, as Tenet has said, an “estimate,” and 
estimates are often based on best guesses.96  Still, hearings on the NIE might 
have enabled Congress to dig deeper into the administration’s rationale for 
war.  They were never held.  There was no time. 
What was at play was the dynamic described by Rourke.97  No member of 
Congress wanted to be seen as weak on terrorism.  The administration timed its 
national campaign to win approval for the war for September in an election 
year, one year after the 9/11 attack.98  If more time had been taken to examine 
the case for war more deeply, Democrats would have suffered at the polls, the 
pundits opined.  There was no time. 
There were many ex post facto explanations given for voting to approve 
the war.  Most in Washington believed that Saddam had WMD, not perhaps 
nuclear weapons, but chemical and biological weapons.99  Few accepted the 
case that there was an al Qaeda connection.100  Many said they wanted to 
strengthen the President’s hand in his effort to gain the support of the Security 
Council and that they did not expect him to use the authority to go to war 
without U.N. approval.101  All of these explanations would have been 
unneeded if the war had gone well.  As the nation has turned against the war, 
so has the Congress. 
Congress was not the only institution that let down the Republic in the Iraq 
matter.  There was an overwhelming internal dynamic in favor of war with Iraq 
inside the Bush administration that made open debate difficult, if not 
impossible.  George Tenet put it this way: “There was never a serious debate 
that I know of within the administration about the imminence of the Iraqi 
threat. . . .  Nor was there ever a significant discussion regarding enhanced 
containment of the costs and benefits of such an approach versus full-out 
planning for overt and covert regime change.”102 
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IV.  WAR POWERS, THE FUTURE 
The Congress of the United States has become much more divided and 
partisan in recent years.  There are serious questions as to whether the 
institution can play the role the Founders had envisioned for it on matters of 
war and peace.  Meanwhile, the Executive Branch has used its natural 
attributes of decisiveness and secrecy to take the initiative.  Yet, once again the 
Founders’ fear that the Executive acting in crisis and alone would be prone to 
major mistakes seems as valid as ever.  As constitutional scholar Louis Fischer 
has argued, “If the current risk to national security is great, so is the risk of 
presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement—all the more reason for 
insistence that military decisions be thoroughly examined and approved by 
Congress.  Contemporary presidential judgments need more, not less, 
scrutiny.”103 
Can Congress be trusted in an age when the nation clearly needs 
efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy in its struggle with terrorists?  A 
government has a fundamental responsibility to provide for the security of its 
people.  The terrorism challenge must be met with a wide variety of policies 
and techniques.  The military option is one of these, but it is a highly visible 
and very blunt instrument.  One counter-terrorism expert, Ambassador Henry 
Crumpton, has said that the military is at best twenty percent of the answer.104  
In fact, as we have learned, the use of the military in inappropriate situations 
can exacerbate the terrorist threat. 
As we have learned from various confrontations between conventional 
military forces and terrorist organizations, there are inherent dangers in seeking 
battlefield victories over an asymmetric force.  Terrorists retain a certain 
tactical advantage when they lure a conventional force onto territory known 
best by the terrorist organization.  The terrorists’ first victory may well be 
luring the dominant power into combat.  The second victory is then gained 
when the terrorists avoid defeat by melting into the civilian landscape, 
radicalizing the local population over the incursion by foreign forces, and 
recruiting more to their cause who are willing to commit suicidal terrorist acts.  
We have seen this scenario play out in Iraq in the past several years, and in 
Southern Lebanon in 2006 when the Israeli army attempted to defeat 
Hezbollah and failed.105 
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In 1986, just after the Gulf of Sidra incident, House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman Fascell challenged the Executive on the issue of taking 
preemptive action against terrorists: 
  . . . [The] new [Executive Branch] theory is that since we have state-
supported terrorism, and since they have declared war on us, we do not really 
have to declare war on them.  The United States, under the Commander in 
Chief theory, and under the theory of self-defense, can attack, can use the 
military might of the United States. . . .106 
Fascell went on to ask whether these theories were, in effect, “modifying the 
[C]onstitution.”107 
As we have accumulated more evidence about terrorist tactics—and about 
the difficulties of engaging them with conventional forces on territory familiar 
to them—the danger of delegating the war power to the President alone has 
become more apparent.  Yet, Congress has thus far failed to play its role as a 
brake as the founders envisioned.  Perhaps its members have been intimidated 
by the ongoing “emergency” called the “war on terrorism.” 
If Congress is politically intimidated in times of crisis and unwilling to 
examine the case for war in depth, what then is the answer?  If the institution is 
weakened and politicized to the point that it is incapable of performing its 
constitutional role, there are only two solutions: (1) change the Constitution or 
(2) strengthen the institution.  I favor the latter. 
V.  COVERT WARS 
When the Senate War Powers Bill (S-440) came to the floor in July 1973, 
Senator Eagleton proposed an amendment that would have the law cover so-
called “covert operations,” combat activity instigated and carried out by 
civilian intelligence officials.108  He argued that the exclusion of combat 
operations undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency constituted a 
loophole that future presidents would exploit.109  Urging his colleagues to 
“make the language of legislation match the realities of war,” Eagleton pointed 
out that “wars do not always begin with the dispatch of troops. They begin 
with more subtle investments . . . of dollars and advisors and civilian 
personnel.”110 
Eagleton’s chief co-sponsors, Senators Stennis and Javits, opposed this 
amendment on the grounds that sensitive intelligence matters should not be 
covered by the legislation.111  However, they agreed to undertake a study of the 
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charter of the intelligence community and into covert activities that could lead 
to war.112  The Eagleton amendment was defeated soundly, but it provided the 
impetus for enhanced congressional scrutiny and oversight of the intelligence 
community and, eventually, to the creation of permanent committees to 
perform this work.113 
In this period after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, it is not any more 
likely that Congress would wish to close this “loophole” in the War Powers 
Resolution.  Still, we have come to realize that taking covert combat action can 
be highly consequential and can lead to a wider war.  Even an attack against 
“known terrorist bases” can produce added hostility toward the United States, 
especially if innocent civilians are killed.  This is the danger of using force 
against an asymmetric force, e.g., international criminals who do not 
acknowledge or respect the international rules of war. 
The demands created by the terrorism threat on the intelligence community 
are very real. Flexibility is required, and special needs are cited to meet the 
challenge of individuals who operate in the shadows.  Congress has 
accommodated these needs by insinuating itself into the decision processes 
related to the requests made by intelligence agencies for presidential 
“findings,” the approval process for covert operations.114  This process may 
have its flaws in that Congress is normally notified on an ex post facto basis, 
but the Executive Branch understands that it will undergo scrutiny and that it 
will be held accountable.  Likewise, the Intelligence Committees have 
demonstrated over time that they can keep a secret, especially when they 
believe that highly sensitive matters or lives are at stake. 
There is no similar process when the Executive is contemplating the 
introduction of U.S. armed forces into hostile situations.  When we take this 
step, whether to attack terrorists or states that we believe are sponsoring them, 
“we do not operate in the shadows; we operate under the glare of international 
scrutiny with all the risks inherent in using overt force in another nation.”115  
As former CIA Director William Colby warned, “military engagements can 
lead ‘by an inexorable process of reactions’ to a general war and to nuclear 
confrontation.  He . . . observed that the use of force as a consistently applied 
policy option might only contribute to the ‘sum of anarchy.’”116 
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VI.  INSTITUTIONALIZING THE WAR POWERS CONSULTATION PROCESS 
The decisions we make in dealing with terrorism require consideration by 
the most experienced minds in our government, in both the Executive and 
Legislative Branches.  The complexity of the problem is so great and the 
ramifications of using force so fateful that we should take the utmost care in 
considering the options. 
What then is the relevance of the War Powers Resolution in this age of 
terrorism?  I believe that a constructive role for Congress is even more 
important today than it was in 1973.  It is my belief that the consultation 
provision provides the opportunity for Congress to play that role.  Congress, 
however, needs to reassert itself as an institution.  It needs to create a process 
that enables it to participate in the decision process before U.S. forces are on 
their way to battle stations.  Congress cannot easily offer advice, manage, or 
even terminate an involvement in hostilities after they have begun.  If Congress 
is to insist on the full implementation of the Section 3 consultation provision, it 
must organize itself to perform this function in a proactive manner that will 
inspire the confidence of the public and the Executive Branch.  Above all, 
Congress must begin to take seriously its constitutional responsibility and find 
ways to avoid being swept away by the political forces so vividly described by 
Rourke.117 
Senator Eagleton, Congressman Lee Hamilton, and Senator Robert Byrd 
have recommended the formation of a special leadership committee.118  This 
committee would be professionally staffed with military, diplomatic, and 
intelligence analysts and assigned responsibility for tracking situations that 
could require the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities.119  Senator Byrd, 
who still serves in the U.S. Senate, has proposed that the “leadership of both 
Houses and the chairmen and ranking members of the foreign relations, armed 
services, and intelligence committees be assigned to this special ‘consultative 
committee.’”120  The participation of these eighteen senior members of 
Congress from both parties could provide strong bipartisan support for 
whatever action is decided upon, including a decision not to use force.  The 
presumption is that it would offer independent views, unintimidated by the 
bureaucratic pressures extant in the Executive Branch. 
The founders of our nation lived in less complicated times, but their 
wisdom on the issue of war carries through to this day.  They did not wish to 
leave the security of our nation and the world to the exclusive judgment of a 
single person whose accountability is limited in the short term. 
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Senator Eagleton met with very impressive legal scholars during his work 
on the Senate war powers legislation.  The late Alexander Bickel, then of Yale 
University Law School, impressed him deeply.  Professor Bickel summed it up 
best: “Singly, either the President or Congress can fall into bad errors, of 
commission or omission.  So they can together, too, but that is somewhat less 
likely, and in any event, together they are all we’ve got.”121  It is not a perfect 
system and the political dynamics surrounding the decision to use force will 
always make dissent difficult; however the decision to go to war should not be 
an easy one.  Congress is a check and balance we need in this complex age of 
terrorism. 
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